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The Afghan Reset: India Back In The Game

Geopolitics is a game of uncertainties and opportunities. On August 15, 2021, when the world witnessed a bloodless coup in Kabul, there was a sense of jitters pervading New Delhi. Many even reminisce about the chaos that followed after the Kabul takeover by Taliban 1.0. Consequently, India withdrew its diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, marking the end of ties. India’s exile was seen as a major jolt; however, some believed it to be a temporary hiatus. Today, after around 3.5 years, the Indo-Afghan relationship under the Taliban seems to be reigniting. This warming up of ties between India and Taliban 2.0 is a monumental shift in India’s Afghan policy. Up until now, India has always refrained from acknowledging the Taliban as the de jure government of Afghanistan. However, this status quo seems to change. In this piece, we’ll dig into the recent Afghan development and its implications for the region.

Also Read: The Afghan Debacle: Pakistan’s Strategic Depth Gone Wrong

DECIPHERING SHIFT IN INDIA’S AFGHAN POLICY

In January 2025, Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met with Afghanistan’s Acting Foreign Minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, in Dubai. This meeting, the highest-level interaction between the two entities since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, focused on expanding bilateral relations and enhancing trade through Iran’s Chabahar Port. The Taliban acknowledged India as a “significant regional and economic partner” following these discussions. Historically, India refrained from formal interactions with the Taliban, especially during their initial rule in the 1990s. India’s rapprochement with the Taliban began in 2022 when it started dispatching food and medicine as part of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. In the same year, it reopened its mission in Kabul with a small “technical team.” India kept on interacting with the Taliban regime and steadily upgraded its ties. The shift in India’s Afghan policy is governed by the principle of realpolitik and the primacy of national interest.

india afghan ties
Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met with Afghanistan’s Acting Foreign Minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi.

The recent breakthrough in relations between New Delhi and Taliban 2.0 is influenced by several factors. The primary factor is security concerns for India. India is keen to ensure that Afghan territory does not become a haven for anti-India activities. To ensure this, it is paramount to have a practical understanding of the Taliban regime. Analysts note that the Taliban leadership has built confidence in New Delhi by not engaging in actions detrimental to India’s security interests. In a broader perspective, with Pakistan’s relations with the Taliban becoming increasingly strained, India perceives an opportunity to strengthen its influence in Afghanistan. This move could counterbalance Pakistan’s traditional sway over Afghan affairs. Economically, India has invested significantly in Afghanistan’s infrastructure and development projects, totaling over $3 billion. Maintaining and expanding these investments necessitates a working relationship with the current Afghan administration.

INDO-AFGHAN DETENTE: REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS

The regional implications of India’s renewed engagement with the Taliban are multifaceted:

AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan stands to gain several economic, political, and security-related benefits from restoring ties with India. India has already invested over $3 billion in Afghanistan’s infrastructure, including roads, dams, and hospitals. Renewed engagement could lead to more development projects. India’s investment in Iran’s Chabahar Port provides Afghanistan with a reliable trade route, reducing dependence on Pakistan’s Karachi port. Engagement with India, a major global player, can help the Taliban gain international recognition and credibility. Stronger ties with India offer Afghanistan a counterweight to Pakistan, especially as relations between Islamabad and the Taliban remain tense. Furthermore, several Afghan students have studied in India under scholarships. Restored relations could see educational cooperation resume, helping Afghan youth gain higher education. Hence, better ties with India are salutary for Afghanistan in all aspects.

India's afghan policy

PAKISTAN

Pakistan’s opposition to India’s presence in Afghanistan is driven by fears of geopolitical encirclement, economic losses, security threats, and loss of influence over Kabul. As India strengthens ties with the Taliban, Pakistan may struggle to maintain its historical dominance over Afghan affairs. India’s growing ties with the Taliban could prevent Pakistan from using Afghan militants in Kashmir-related conflicts. Pakistan accuses India’s R&AW of supporting Baloch separatists through Afghanistan. Baloch militant groups, such as the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), operate near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, and Islamabad fears India may use Afghan territory to support them. Pakistan sees India’s influence in Afghanistan as an encirclement strategy—India to the east and a pro-India Afghanistan to the west. Closer India-Taliban ties could reduce Pakistan’s influence in Kabul, leaving Pakistan vulnerable on both borders. Furthermore, India’s alternative trade route via Iran’s Chabahar Port reduces Pakistan’s monopoly, hurting its economy and strategic influence.

CHINA

China has sought to expand its influence in Afghanistan through economic investments and diplomatic engagement. A stronger India-Taliban relationship could challenge China’s ambitions. Beijing has relied on Pakistan to control Afghan affairs, but if India builds direct ties with the Taliban, China’s influence may be diluted. Beijing has pressured the Taliban to prevent Uighur extremists, especially members of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), from using Afghan soil. If India gains leverage over the Taliban, it could influence how the Taliban handles Uighur militants—potentially in ways unfavorable to China. China has been eyeing Afghanistan’s mineral wealth, including rare earth metals, lithium, and copper. If India increases its involvement, China may face competition. Furthermore, if India expands its connectivity through Iran’s Chabahar Port, it could offer Afghanistan an alternative and would shatter China’s plan to involve Afghanistan in CPEC.

THE WAY FORWARD

India’s engagement with Afghanistan under Taliban rule requires a two-pronged approach—to safeguard its strategic interests while maintaining its longstanding goodwill with the Afghan people. India should maintain regular diplomatic engagements with the Taliban leadership. Instead of formal recognition, India can pursue a functional engagement model, ensuring its interests without fully legitimizing the Taliban. India can invest in Afghanistan’s lithium, copper, and rare earth minerals, securing resources while aiding Afghanistan’s economic revival. India should collaborate with partners like Iran, Russia, and Central Asian countries to monitor terrorist activities originating from Afghanistan. Further encourage the Taliban to take action against groups like ISIS-K, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). Simultaneously, India should resume work on unfinished Indian-funded projects, such as Salma Dam, roads, and hospitals, to reinforce India’s developmental role and strengthen its goodwill within local Afghan society.

salma dam
SALMA DAM.

CONCLUSION

In summary, India’s restoration of ties with the Taliban reflects a strategic recalibration aimed at safeguarding its interests and contributing to regional stability. While challenges persist, especially concerning human rights under Taliban rule, India’s engagement underscores the complex interplay of security, economic, and geopolitical factors shaping regional dynamics. India’s approach to Afghanistan must be pragmatic, security-conscious, and economically driven. India must focus on humanitarian support, trade expansion, infrastructure investment, and regional coordination. By maintaining a functional relationship with the Taliban while preserving its historic goodwill with the Afghan people, India can secure long-term strategic benefits without fully endorsing the current regime.

Anmol Kaushik

Hi, I'm Anmol Kaushik, I'm currently pursuing Law (4th year) at Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies (GGSIPU). I'm a defence enthusiast and a keen geopolitical observer.

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